The dramatic fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria has had reverberations in far-away China, which had been cultivating Damascus as an ally in the volatile Middle East.
On social media, the Communist Party and the foreign policy experts who backed it have come under criticism for the failed gamble.
China had made large investments in the region, which have now all but turned into massive losses. Also, Beijing’s over-reliance on Iran and Russia — both countries have been blamed for abandoning the Assad regime — in order to gain a foothold in the Middle East is now being called “poor” diplomacy.
According to a report by the Cyprus-headquartered consultancy firm Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (COAR), following the Syrian government’s victory against the rebel forces in Aleppo in 2016, China’s financial assistance to Damascus jumped 100 times from $500,000 to $54 million in just one year. Additionally, Beijing also made long-term investments in Syrian oil and gas, totalling about $3 billion.
Three major concerns
Leading foreign affairs columnists in the Chinese mainstream media have been alarmed by the large numbers of netizens expressing concerns regarding a) China’s growing interests in the Middle East region as an economic and development partner; b) should China get in big countries’ power-games in the region; and c) what should China do to prevent the United States from disrupting Beijing’s “westward plan?”
This echoes what happened after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war — both diplomatically and geopolitically, China’s stakes were high, but popular comments on Chinese social media conflicted with the official party line. What netizens this time around are asking is that with Iran and Russia having failed in holding Syria together, is it worth for Beijing to (alone) compete against the US position of dominance in the Middle East?
Social media posts have scoffed at what now seemed China’s exaggerated diplomatic achievements recently in the region, namely the Beijing-brokered truce between major Palestinian rival factions Fatah and Hamas earlier this year, and the Saudi Arabia-Iran surprise “diplomatic détente” in March 2023, for which China gave itself credit.
It is indeed surprising that Chinese netizens have nearly echoed overseas analysts’ views in criticising the two “diplomatic achievements” above. A report in Reuters recently pointed out that despite repeated rounds of diplomatic efforts, a unity government was yet to emerge in Palestine.
Xi’s bet on Assad
Pro-Beijing think tank analysts and scholars are now being criticised for exaggerating Assad’s “historic” visit to Hangzhou last year in September.
On the personal initiative of President Xi Jinping, Assad was invited to inaugurate the Asian Games. This came just six months after the Saudi Arabia-Iran “historic” diplomatic normalisation.
A Chinese current affairs commentator, Heng He, said, “Beijing’s support for Assad was largely hinging upon its alignment with Iran and Russia, something that Beijing may now be revaluating.”
Some say Xi’s red-carpet welcome to Assad in Hangzhou and the signing of a “strategic partnership” agreement between the two countries was how “imperial” Beijing rewarded “loyal” Damascus for formally joining Xi’s signature initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) earlier in 2022. Additionally, Beijing had provided a diplomatic shield for Bashar-al-Assad by blocking numerous resolutions in the UNSC in recent years. The Chinese ambassador at the UN, Zhang Jun, proactively criticised sanctions against Syria by the US and the EU nations.
Within days of Assad’s fall, netizens in China had begun questioning the PRC regime and the CPC leadership for “patronising” Syria’s “fake socialist” regime.
On China’s largest and most popular social media, WeChat, a Chinese blogger, Ji Feng, said, “The Assad issue is definitely an outlet for a lot of people [in China].”
Netizens also took aim at Li Shaoxian, dean of the China-Arab States Research Institute at Ningxia University, who said in a Dec. 4 interview with Phoenix TV that it was highly unlikely that Assad would be overthrown.
China’s lessons after Assad’s fall
Some Chinese have started saying that the resources China wasted in Syria and in the Middle East should have been put to better use in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, China’s core interests.
At another level, China’s netizens have “dared” to ridicule China’s international relations experts, terming them “hampered by their need to repeat the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s official line on everything, rather than taking a coldly analytical view of international developments.”
China’s IR scholars had patted their own backs when Syria was reinstated last year to the Arab League after it was suspended from the body 12 years ago. Yin Gang, a researcher at the prestigious China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing, then said: “China undoubtedly will play a very important part as Syria seeks a new balanced and comprehensive diplomacy in this new historical era.”
To conclude, applauding Assad’s 6-day Beijing visit last year – his first in almost two decades – Chinese strategic affairs experts had expressed full confidence that “his visit will push bilateral relations to a new level and a string of practical cooperation projects are likely to be initiated.”
After Assad’s fall, scholars in China are now calling for “deep thinking” and learning “profound lessons.” Realising the limitations of China’s diplomacy in both Syria and in the region, some scholars are saying the biggest lesson for China’s policymakers is to re-evaluate Beijing’s over-reliance on Iran and Russia.
Dr Hemant Adlakha teaches Chinese at JNU, and is Vice-Chairperson and Honorary Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi.
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